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Ross, Michael L. “Does oil hinder democracy?.” World politics 53, no. 3 (2001): 325-361

Brahim Bergougui, Syed Mansoob Murshed. “New evidence on the oil-democracy nexus utilising the Varieties of Democracy data.” Resources Policy 69 (2020): 1-21

Raed Asad Ahmed. “A critical analysis of the role of oil in hindering transition towards democracy in the Middle East.”  Information, Society and Justice 3 no. 2 (2010): 95-105 

Numerous complicated variables influence the establishment of regime types all around the world. Some of these variables would include economic resources, social cleavages, and historical processes. Throughout the years, several scholars have attempted to understand the factors that contribute to authoritarianism and democracies by utilizing several case studies, which were mostly country examples. While some studies focused on local examples to produce more visible results, others broadened their scope and tried to address regime problems globally. In this comparative puzzle, I wanted to focus more on the “national resource curse” to see if that really is the case. Therefore, I will try to critically analyze three related articles: Michael L. Ross’ “Does oil hinder democracy?”; Brahim Bergougui and Syed Mansoob Murshed’s “New evidence on the oil-democracy nexus utilizing the Varieties of Democracy data”; and Raed Asad Ahmed’s “A critical analysis of the role of oil in hindering transition towards democracy in the Middle East.” After determining their independent variables during this assessment, I will critically assess their dependent variables/outcomes, which is when some countries are hindered by oil for a democratic regime; in some of them, it does not hinder democracy. In other words, “Is resource always a curse?” will be the puzzle for this analytical study. 

In his article, Ross investigates whether oil hinders democracy; thus, his main dependent variable is the degree of democracy. He assesses democracy through the application of the Polity IV Index. In the process, he explores three causative mechanisms: the “rentier effect,” the “repression effect,” and the “modernization effect.” He asserts that there exists at least provisional support for the notion that the three mechanisms create a “resource curse,” which would inevitably result in authoritarian governance. Therefore, his dependent variable is clear: the regime type (democracy or not), and the independent variable is oil.  Ross asserts that oil impedes democracy and is both legitimate and statistically solid; he emphasizes that oil hurts democracy. He asserts that oil inflicts greater harm on underdeveloped states than on industrialized ones. He specifically cites the United States, the United Kingdom, and Norway in comparison to other nations. He asserts that oil wealth has likely impeded democratization not only in the Middle East but also in nations such as Mexico and Nigeria. His argument is that reliance on resource wealth, particularly oil, makes governments less accountable and impedes democratic reforms.

Murshed and Bergougui, in their study, attempt to analyze the intricate relationship between oil and democracy, diverging from previous studies. In conjunction with the investigation of democracy, they also examine democratic measures that function as its dependent variables. Consequently, their inquiry explores which democratic principles are hindered by oil, leading to a deficiency in democracy. They contend that the correlation between oil wealth and institutional quality demonstrates how robust institutions can convert the impact of political resources into a more impartial or beneficial outcome. The quality of institutions, evaluated by the rule of law, is a crucial factor in alleviating the influence of oil on democratic processes. The comparison of oil wealth between LAC and MENA nations further supports their conclusions. The authors assert that oil wealth in the LAC region may exert a neutral or perhaps beneficial influence on democracy. They identify an opposite relationship between oil and democratic indicators in the MENA region, so verifying the political resource curse theory in this context. Thus, their findings suggest that robust institutional frameworks, particularly a strong rule of law, alleviate the negative impacts of oil revenue on democratic advancement. In countries with high institutional quality, oil revenue may have a less harmful or potentially advantageous effect on democracy.

Ahmed asserts that a state’s historical context and the extent of its institutional development prior to the discovery or production of oil significantly influence whether this natural resource will be a blessing or a burden. In his analysis, similar to Ross’s, he highlights the phenomenon of the rentier effect and the impacts of modernity effects. His independent variable remains oil, while his dependent variable encompasses not only democracy and support for democracy but also political accountability. He asserts that oil facilitates the maintenance of authoritarian governance by enabling governments to finance security forces and suppress dissent, thereby obviating the necessity for public accountability. In alignment with Ross’ argument, the MENA region experiences a democratic deficit related to oil wealth, which furnishes governments with substantial financial resources that can strengthen authoritarian regimes and avoid democratic reforms. However, again as Ross, he also notes the existence of other oil-rich nations, such as Norway, which successfully uphold their democracies and achieve robust economic development, remaining resilient against the resource curse.

A critical analysis of Ross’s and Ahmed’s pieces in the modern context necessitates an examination of their historical background first. Their articles discuss the Middle East before the Arab Spring. It also takes into account a global context before the contemporary notion of democratic backsliding in comparison to the present world. Consequently, I contend that these two studies reveal a deficiency in the focus on political ideology and governance failures in the modern world. As a supportive case, Venezuela serves as a primary illustration of the assertion that “oil impedes democracy”; however, this phenomenon should also be attributed to democratic backsliding that began with Hugo Chavez and later continued through Nicolas Maduro. While both Ross and Ahmed cite the oil-rich state of Norway as a democratic example in contrast to other nations, they neglect to consider the pre-institutional frameworks that may influence countries when compared to others, particularly those in the MENA region, where institutions are constructed in a markedly different historical background. Consequently, Ross’ and Ahmed’s work may “hinder” its applicability to the modern world, both locally and globally, due to its insufficient focus on political ideology, institutions, and social movements related to governance failures or risings. On the other hand, one may critique the work of Bergougui and Murshed for the possibility of endogeneity concerns. The relationship between oil riches and institutional strength remains unclear; it is uncertain if oil wealth undermines institutions or if nations with weak institutions have a tendency to suffer the resource curse. The three pieces collectively demonstrate that the relationship between oil wealth and democracy is intricate and contingent upon circumstance. Examining the impact of oil wealth necessitates consideration of regional geopolitics and the influence of foreign actors in order to have a comprehensive understanding of the factors that shape regime types. However, all three articles lack clarity on the role of international actors, geopolitics, and international sanctions. In conclusion, although it is evident that oil hurts democracy by providing apparatuses to authoritarian regimes, further investigation is necessary to determine whether oil alone also impacts democracies in Western nations like Norway.